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ABSTRACT
Human social interaction is studied by researchers in conversation analysis
(CA) and psychology, but the dominant methodologies within these two
disciplines are very different. Analyzing methodological differences in rela-
tion to major developments in the philosophy of science, we suggest that a
central difference is that psychologists tend to follow Popper’s falsification-
ism in dissociating the context of discovery and the context of justification.
In CA, following Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology, these two contexts are
much closer to one another, if not inextricable. While this dissociation
allows the psychologist a much larger theoretical freedom, because psy-
chologists “only” need to validate their theories by generating confirmed
predictions from experiments, it also carries the risk of generating theories
that are less robust and pertinent to everyday interaction than the body of
knowledge accumulated by CA. However, as long as key philosophical
differences are well understood, it is not an inherently bad idea to generate
predictions from theories and use quantitative and experimental methods
to test them. It is both desirable and achievable to find a synthesis between
methodologies that combines their strengths and avoids their weaknesses.
We discuss a number of challenges that would need to be met and some
opportunities that may arise from creating such a synthesis.
Two major scientific areas of study that focus on human social interaction are conversation analysis
(henceforth CA) and experimental psychology (henceforth psychology).1 Both approaches ultimately
aim to understand how people interact with one another by the orderly exchange of a variety of
observable behaviors. But while the ultimate goals and empirical commitments of CA and interac-
tion psychology are fairly similar, the basic definitions and methodologies they employ in studying
human interaction are very different.
CA has been used in discursive psychology and ethnomethodology to redefine mind, cognition, and
language—the basic phenomena that psychologists study—in terms of participants’ interactional
achievements (Coulter, 1979, pp. 9–34; Potter & Te Molder, 2005). Similarly, core methods of coding
and categorization often used by psychologists2 have been repositioned in CA as methods participants
use themselves for drawing inferences and accomplishing “social action” in conversation (Sacks, 1995,
p. 582; Schegloff, 2007). However, this critical respecification of psychology’s core definitions and
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1As our aim is not to discuss how the epistemic territory of the study of social interaction is divided up between different
psychological subdisciplines, we simply note here that interaction has been addressed predominantly, but not exclusively, by
psycholinguists, social psychologists, and cognitive psychologists.
2Although qualitative and antirealist approaches offer many critical alternatives and nuances, the dominant standards of
evidence across many subfields of psychology are based on formal coding, experimental methods, and quantitative analysis
(Toomela, 2014).
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methods (Button, 1991) renders CA’s key findings about cognition less straightforwardly usable (or even
recognizable as findings) within psychology and reduces the relevance of any specific focus on cognition
for CA (Kitzinger, 2006). Suggestions as to how CA could present findings more compatibly with
psychology (see, e.g., Stivers, 2015; Stokoe, 2012) have often involved discussions about the irreconcilable
philosophical differences between CA and conventional approaches to coding, quantification, and
statistical analysis (Couper-Kuhlen, 2010; Nishizaka, 2015; Schegloff, 1993; Steensig & Heinemann,
2015). In this article, however, we want to focus on the core aims and similarities shared by CA and
psychology, to identify what they can learn from their differences. We strongly believe that these two
approaches to the study of human interaction can and should find a practical synthesis that combines
their strengths and avoids their weaknesses.
We will first discuss the main similarities between the two disciplines. We will then proceed to
discuss a number of fundamental differences between CA and Psychology, viewed from a Philosophy
of Science perspective. Not surprisingly, these differences have led to dissimilar scientific practices,
which is what we discuss next. We then discuss how each discipline can benefit from adopting
principles and practices from the other, followed by a list of concrete proposals and challenges for a
fruitful methodological fusion.
Important similarities between CA and psychology
Shared skepticism about introspection, and commitment to empirical data
The most salient similarity between the methods used in these fields is that both CA and psychology
reject introspection as a viable source of information about the adequacy of our theories. In CA,
distrust of introspection is an explicit part of its methodology (see, e.g., Schegloff, 1996). Human
interaction cannot be adequately analyzed and understood by attributing beliefs and desires to the
participants and then applying folk-psychological3 reasoning about what happens in interaction.
Instead, CA researchers analyze interaction strictly with reference to the observable behavior of the
participants, using detailed transcripts to interrogate and describe the minutiae of naturalistic
interaction. The CA research process is encapsulated by the question “why that now?” (Schegloff
& Sacks, 1973), a question that researchers repeatedly ask themselves while looking at data—and
which they also assume is relevant for participants at every moment during a conversation: “Why
does the interactant display that particular behavior at that particular point in the sequence of
mutual exchanges, and which social action is being coordinated with each exchange?” Anyone with
even minimal exposure to CA will have noticed that this rigorous way of analyzing interaction is
incompatible with colloquial explanations based on researchers’ own introspections or folk-
psychological intuitions (Sacks, 1984, p. 25).
While some older traditions in psychology, most notably the one founded by Wilhelm Wundt,
did rely on introspection of both researchers and experimental participants (Schultz & Schultz,
2004), the basic tenet of psychologists since the beginning of the 20th century has always been that
they understand their subjects better than those subjects understand themselves. This was quite
explicitly the case in Freudian psychology, where hidden sexual motives were assumed to be
powerful forces controlling our mental lives, while our powerless and underinformed ego is blissfully
unaware of this (Winch, 1990, pp. 47–48). Later, the doctrine of behaviorism tried to get rid of all
“mentalistic” concepts (Costall, 2006), which was even more incompatible with introspection. But
even after the so-called cognitive revolution, when mental representations became reputable again in
computational incarnations, their existence, role, and nature tended to be demonstrated using
reaction times and other behavioral measures (see, e.g., the famous mental rotation experiments
by Shepard & Metzler, 1971), and experimental studies continue to use and extend this approach
using neurophysiological recordings and neuroimaging data. There are still pleas for the
3See, e.g., Fodor (1991).
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reintroduction of introspective data as a useful source of information in psychology (Kingstone,
Smilek, & Eastwood, 2008) in order to relate these experimentally constrained measures more
directly to the natural social actions they seek to emulate and explain. However, introspection has
been—and still remains—a suspect source of information in psychology. While both CA and
experimental psychology have a healthy distrust toward introspective accounts, and both are
committed to a strong empirical orientation, they approach the task of gathering valid and compel-
ling empirical evidence about human interaction very differently. To explain their differences in a
way that emphasizes the possibilities of a practical synthesis will require a brief discussion of the
methodological foundations of the two disciplines in relation to key developments in the philosophy
of science.
Shared skepticism about metaphysics and problems regarding induction
Since the ancient Greeks, philosophers have struggled with the so-called demarcation problem:
Which theory, statement, or claim is scientific, and which one is not (Popper in Miller, 1985).
This is a deceptively difficult problem, and as far as we are aware, philosophers are still far from
reaching a satisfactory consensus on the issue (Laudan, 1983; Resnik, 2000). One approach to solving
this problem was verificationism, suggested around the beginning of the 20th century by the logical
empiricists from the Vienna Circle led by influential scientists/philosophers like Moritz Schlick,
Rudolph Carnap, and Otto Neurath (Creath, 2014). Their proposed solution was to only consider
scientific any statement (or “sentence,” as they often called it) that was either based on direct
experience (observation), or was a “synthetic sentence,” i.e., a sentence constructed from a combina-
tion of observables and logical terms. These sentences can then be verified and/or falsified. The main
goal of this attempt to solve the demarcation problem was to distinguish scientific theories from
metaphysics. Logical empiricism therefore revolves around the use of unobservable, theoretical
concepts and asks in what ways and under which conditions the concepts thus stated are allowed
to be part of a scientific theory.
The logical empiricists’ solution to the demarcation problem turns out to be unsatisfactory for a
number of reasons. First, there is a logical problem. As Popper (2005 [1959]) pointed out, logical
empiricism centrally relies on induction. From many observations of white swans, one infers the
generalization that all swans are white. Early Empiricist philosopher David Hume’s original “problem
of induction”4 is that one can never be sure. The observation of only one black swan would suffice to
prove the generalization wrong. Another more practical problem with verificationism is that it is very
tedious to specify all aspects of a theory all the way down to the level of observables and logical rules.
This requirement leads to theoretical complexity and stifles the progress of science considerably.
Differences between CA and psychology
Psychology adopted Popper’s solution of falsificationism
In an attempt to circumvent these problems, Popper (1959/2005) suggested his famous solution of
falsificationism. Due to the limitations of inference by induction, we can never be certain that a
theory is true, only that it is false. So instead of relying on observational and synthetic sentences to
“prove” a theory directly from the empirical data, we can just propose a theory, and (collectively) try
to use empirical data to disprove (falsify) it. As long as a theory hasn’t been falsified, it stands, but we
can never claim that it is true, only that it has not been proven false yet. Of course, this solution only
works if the theory actually generates predictions that can be empirically tested. The demarcation
problem is thereby solved as well: Any theory that can (in principle, potentially) be falsified by
4Hume (1738–40/1888, p. 89) did not actually use the word induction but suggested we should be skeptical about the way
“instances of which we have had no experience resemble those of which we have had experience.”
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empirical data is a scientific theory. This has some unexpected and often overlooked consequences.
For instance, imagine an astrologer making the claim that people with the star sign Capricorn tend
to be hard-working people. This is a testable prediction. For instance, we could check whether a
sample of people with star sign Capricorn work longer hours than a random control sample of
people with other star signs. So as long as astrologers are willing to make empirically testable
predictions, astrology is, according to Popper’s demarcation criterion, a scientific theory. In
Popper’s falsificationism any theory that can, at least in principle, be proven wrong by data is a
scientific theory. This assumption liberated science because not every theory had to be meticulously
reduced to observables and logical connectives. So when Einstein conceived of his general theory of
relativity on the basis of a number of highly imaginative thought experiments, or when other
theoretical physicists postulated the existence of new elementary particles that nobody had ever
observed (see, e.g., Higgs, 1964), these were bona fide scientific theories because they generated
empirically testable predictions (CMS Collaboration, 2012).
Here, we want to focus on an important assumption that Popper made for his meta-theory of
science—namely, the separation of the context of discovery from the context of justification. The
context of discovery is about the origin of our theory, how we arrived at it; whereas the context of
justification is how we establish its empirical adequacy. In verificationism, these two are very similar,
if not the same. But in falsificationism, they are completely independent. That is, it is irrelevant for
the scientific-ness of a theory how someone comes up with it. It doesn’t matter whether a theory is
discovered through thought experiments, divine revelation, hard work, induction, drug use, or
having an apple falling on one’s head, as long as the predictions of the resulting theory can be
empirically tested. It is in this respect that the methodological commitments of CA and psychology,
despite their shared suspicions about introspection and reliance on empirical data, perhaps differ
most crucially. Methods within psychology are heavily influenced by the doctrine of falsificationism;
whereas CA inherently relies on inductive methods (Levinson, 1983).
CA adopted Hume’s skeptical solution of reflexive normativity
Popper’s falsificationism was a solution to Hume’s “problem of induction” with the aim of banishing
metaphysics from causal claims in the natural sciences. While remaining skeptical about induction,
Hume suggested it is inevitable that we interpret the world by drawing causal inferences based on
our “customary” or normative perceptual experiences (Hume, 1748/1921). In other words, Hume
assumed that induction must be inherent to human cognition (Kripke, 1982, p. 67). Hume developed
this “skeptical solution” (Dauer, 1980) to problems of induction specifically in relation to human
social action by suggesting how individuals within societies must determine their own moral codes.
Hume (1748/1921) used an allegorical figure, which he called the “sensible knave,” to explain how
people make autonomous moral choices even in the absence of an omnipotent God or a ubiquitous
system of laws or social rules. They do so by internalizing social norms and “surveying ourselves as it
were, in reflection” through the eyes of others. He called the knave “sensible” because when he
makes knavelike choices, and transgresses norms and laws, he feels his transgression as a moral
“sense” and also because he is sensible enough not to behave so badly that he brings down the system
of laws on which his exploits depend: “[a] sensible knave, in particular incidents, may think that an
act of iniquity or infidelity will make a considerable addition to his fortune, without causing any
considerable breach in the social union and confederacy” (Hume, 1777/2010, pp. 282–283). In
human behavior, then, Hume outlined a self-interested, autonomous basis for morality in reflexive
normativity (Korsgaard, 1994, pp. 55–61). The knave upholds social norms by bending, not “breach-
ing,” them and thereby demonstrates his reliance on—and the inherent relevance of—the norms
themselves. Like verificationism in the natural sciences, Hume’s reflexive normativity has informed
sociological theories of “voluntaristic” social action (Parsons, 1937, p. 76) that appeal to normative
conventions in order to avoid metaphysical explanations in the human sciences. A similar principle
of reflexive normativity is used in speech act theory to explain how performative speech acts,
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through repeated use, reflexively engender normative states of affairs (Austin, 1979, pp. 233–235), or
how Gricean maxims function under the normative assumption of cooperativity (Grice, 1975).
Garfinkel’s move from reflexive normativity to reflexive accountability
However, Parsons’s student Garfinkel—like Popper—was still very skeptical about induction as a
method and doubted that reflexive normativity could account for specific instances of social
interaction. Garfinkel saw that this solution simply deferred problems of induction and turned
them into questions of interpretative relevance (Schütz, 1962, p. 113), leaving open the problem of
precisely which convention might be relevant in each specific situation and in what ways. This is
especially problematic for scientific theories that separate the context of discovery from the context
of justification and use “bridging assumptions”5 to link measures of reflexively normative tendencies
with causal claims about human action. Garfinkel (1967, pp. 70–71) illustrated this criticism by
describing a counterpart allegorical figure for Hume’s “sensible knave,” which he called the “judg-
mental dope.” The dope exhibits behaviors during experimental tasks that are set out for him in
advance by the scientist’s own normative expectations about how such things should work. He is
“judgmental” because when given a choice, he inevitably chooses between the alternatives decided
for him in advance. He is a “dope”—meaning gullible or easily fooled—because he only ever makes
these fixed choices. Like the tourist in a bazaar, when given the option to haggle, he always just pays
the seller’s asking price (Lynch, 2012).
Garfinkel thought that if Hume’s sensible knave exhibits reflexively normative choices by bending
the rules without a “breach in the social union and confederacy,” there are two problems. First,
which norms and ostensible rules are relevant in specific situations? And second, where and at which
point do they breach? To investigate the latter question, Garfinkel conducted a series of “breaching
experiments,” which would horrify today’s ethics committees, that attempted to find the limits of the
sensible knave’s norms. He asked his students to deliberately start behaving in transgressive ways
and to observe the reactions of the public. They found that in practice, no reliable normative limits
exist. Instead, people tend to reinterpret transgressions as intelligible—or “accountable”—within the
situation at hand. Some transgressions even turned into new norms; when students were asked to
haggle for fixed-price goods and were often—though not always—successful, many then adopted
haggling as a new standard practice. Following Wittgenstein (1953), Garfinkel’s solution to the
problem of induction was to suggest that there are no reflexively normative, relevant “rules” for
human action but rather ongoing processes of reflexive mutual accountability. He showed that these
problems of interpretative relevance are insoluble in theory and emphasized that scientists must pay
close attention to each situation and how participants themselves solve these problems in practice.
Instead of studying norms, Ethnomethodology studies the methods that participants develop and use
to make sense of situated social action. CA, like most social sciences, still relies on reflexive
normativity to explain, for example, how participants in conversation only optionally conform to
normative patterns of turn taking, and how they exploit these patterns interactionally by deviating
from them in an orderly manner (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974, pp. 696–697, note 1). The key
difference is that—as a branch of ethnomethodology focused on conversation (Lynch, 2000)—CA
avoids relying on these norms to formulate causal explanations or theoretical claims about human
action to be tested “outside” a situated domain of discovery. This means that CA is not inherently
incompatible with psychological theories that postulate the relevance of mental events, as long as
participants themselves treat such events as relevant, situated, interactional issues.
5A bridging assumption suggests that normatively appropriate contextual factors can be reliably inferred to uphold the causal
connections between an observable fact and its ostensible meanings (Matsui, 2000, pp. 93–94). Garfinkel warned that—if used
inappropriately in studies of human action—these assumptions could allow problems of induction to creep back into the causal
explanations supported by an otherwise rigorous experiment.
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Difference in scientific practices between CA and psychology
The distinct solutions to problems of induction represented by falsificationism and ethnomethodol-
ogy point to clear differences in how research is conducted in practice within psychology and CA,
and how each has advantages and disadvantages. These differences have major implications
(and also suggest incentives) for a methodological fusion. It is therefore useful to outline the
major points of difference between their scientific practices.
Psychology’s reliance on null hypothesis significance testing
Research psychologists mostly try to follow the role model of the natural sciences, which is still
heavily influenced by falsificationism. When psychologists formulate a new theory or hypothesis,
they usually support it by deriving a prediction, for instance about a difference between a number of
aggregated measurements, called an effect. Then, the psychologist will collect data (by performing an
experiment or by analyzing existing data sources, e.g., corpora), and show that the predicted effect
indeed exists. Formally, however, the psychologist posits a null hypothesis, corresponding with there
being no such difference or effect. After collecting data, she uses inferential statistics to show that the
predicted effect is indeed present and is probably not caused by random variation. This then allows
the psychologist to reject the null hypothesis, meaning that the alternative hypothesis, which is
actually what she wanted to prove, is accepted. Oddly, while this procedure superficially looks like
the application of Popper’s falsificationism, and it may have been motivated by it, really it isn’t. The
aim of the typical successful (i.e., publishable) psychological study is to show that the prediction
derived from the proposed theory is true, which is claimed as support for the theory. So it is not the
case, as strict falsificationism would require, that the aim is to show that one has tried hard but so far
failed to falsify one’s own theory. This is clearly revealed by the fact that if the null hypothesis cannot
be rejected (because the predicted effect was not significant), the results are usually not even
published because null effects are deemed uninformative. So the result that would actually count
as a falsification (not being able to reject the null hypothesis) is usually not published and seen as an
uninteresting “failure.” It is not deemed particularly interesting news that someone has come up with
a theory that produced a prediction that hasn’t been empirically confirmed. When null effects
representing unconfirmed predictions are published in the peer-reviewed literature, it is usually in
the context of an explicit attempt at replicating a previously reported finding (e.g., Doyen, Klein,
Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). In fact, null hypothesis significance
testing (NHST—the standard inferential-statistical paradigm) does not even allow for accepting a
null hypothesis. All it allows for is stating that the null hypothesis has not been rejected, but NHST
can never tell us whether this was due to an insufficient amount of data (too much noise to be able to
tell) or to the null hypothesis probably being true. So, intriguingly, neither the publication practices
nor the standard statistical paradigm in psychology allow for direct falsification of a proposed theory.
While the logic of supporting theories by rejecting null hypotheses in psychology is not strictly
falsificationist, the separation of context of discovery and context of justification is, and this
distinction has been enthusiastically embraced in psychology. In principle, as long as it predicts an
effect that is subsequently shown to be statistically significant, a psychologist can come up with
literally any hypothesis. In practice, the research psychologist is often inspired by theories in other
fields (see, e.g., Pickering & Garrod, 2013) or lacunae in the existing literature. The social psychol-
ogist Daryl Bem went a step further and explicitly recommended searching in already collected data
for significant differences that suggest new hypotheses (Bem, 2003). But this practice is controversial,
as it uses the same data for the generation as well as the testing of hypotheses (a practice
Kriegeskorte, Simmons, Bellgowan, & Baker, 2009, call “double dipping”) and fails to make the
methodologically important distinction between exploratory and confirmatory research (De Groot
et al., 2014; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, & Van Der Maas, 2011).
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The statistical testing of predictions from hypotheses is connected to another way that methods in
psychology differ from CA: the abundant use of summary statistics, such as means and medians.
Using aggregate values (e.g., frequency counts or proportions) in the study of human interaction has
been sharply criticized by Schegloff (1993). In Schegloff’s own compact formulation: “It seems quite
clear to me that parties to interaction do not laugh per minute” (p. 104). Another problem with
using aggregate values is that they may inadvertently conceal the role of hidden but important
variables, which, when taken into account, may even reverse the direction of a relation between two
variables: a problem known as Simpson’s paradox (Simpson, 1951).
CA’s reliance on naturalistic data
This approach is fundamentally different from methods in CA, which explicitly avoid invoking
entities or concepts that are not firmly grounded in natural observation. In the words of Heritage
(1984, p. 236):
[CA’s] insistence on the use of data collected from naturally occurring occasions of everyday interaction is
paralleled by a corresponding avoidance of a range of other research methodologies as unsatisfactory sources of
data. These include: (1) the use of interviewing techniques in which the verbal formulations of subjects are
treated as an appropriate substitute for the observation of actual behavior; (2) the use of observational methods
in which data are recorded through field notes or with pre-coded schedules; (3) the use of native intuitions as a
means of inventing examples of interactional behavior; and (4) the use of experimental methodologies involving
the direction or manipulation of behavior.
Here, Heritage comprehensively sums up the types of data that linguists, psycholinguists, and
cognitive psychologists tend to use to confirm the predictions generated from their theories. This is a
major difference in approach between psychology and CA, and we want to suggest here that the
reason psychologists are not worried about using these types of data is partially due to the historical
influence of falsificationism, which tries to “decouple” the context of discovery from the context of
justification.
However, while CA has maintained its methodological focus, discursive psychology (Potter & Te
Molder, 2005; Tileagă & Stokoe, 2015) and ethnomethodological studies of work and “institutional
talk” (Drew & Heritage, 1992; Heath & Luff, 2000) have also used CA successfully in more formal
and constrained interactional settings. Recordings of interaction can be informative materials for CA
as long as they are treated as evidence of how participants themselves coproduce each setting as
interactionally relevant (Sacks, 1995, pp. 12–13). As CA’s contexts of study have become increasingly
diverse, multimodal (Nevile, 2015), and mobile, it has relied on its core methods to remain resolutely
“qualitative, inductive, and strictly empirical” (Haddington, Mondada, & Nevile, 2013, p. 7) and
essentially tried to minimize the separation of the context of discovery from the context of
justification as much as possible. Analysts begin by noticing recurrent patterns or skewed distribu-
tions of some candidate phenomena while reviewing and transcribing recordings of interaction, then
interrogating their possible interactional uses during presentation and discussion at regular CA “data
sessions” (Harris, Theobald, Danby, Reynolds, & Rintel, 2012). Many iterations of this process
produce detailed “single-case analyses” until sufficiently large collections of standard cases and
various “deviant cases” (that explicate participants’ own orderly management of nonstandard
cases) can provide generic criteria for a clear characterization of the phenomenon (Schegloff,
1996).6 All this careful, qualitative work is necessary before researchers can even begin the process
of developing a formal coding schema for a quantitative study (Stivers & Enfield, 2010)—and this
last step is still far from being universally accepted within CA (Stivers, 2015). This process has the
reassuring advantage that the phenomena described are guaranteed to have actually occurred in
reality, not only in our theoretical imagination, and—ideally—to have been subjected to various
6Schegloff (1968) famously describes collecting up to 500 cases of telephone call openings, and his key finding about the
sequential order of ringing and greeting exchanges hinges on the detailed explication of a single “deviant case.”
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forms of critical “peer review” early and often. CA’s ethnomethodological research tradition does not
attempt to solve problems of induction but goes to great lengths to mitigate them. This procedure
probably underpins the fact that the body of knowledge accumulated by half a century of CA
research is impressively robust: Many of the central phenomena that have been discovered and
reported by CA researchers have later been confirmed using a variety of quantitative and/or
experimental methods (see, e.g., Bögels, Kendrick, & Levinson, 2015; De Ruiter, Mitterer, &
Enfield, 2006; Enfield et al., 2013; Kendrick & Torreira, 2015; Stivers et al., 2009).
How CA and psychology can improve each other
CA can help with psychology’s replication crisis
Psychology, on the other hand, especially social psychology, is going through a serious “replication
crisis” (Pashler & Harris, 2012; Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012): It has recently been discovered that
many of the published findings of experimental studies turn out not to be reproducible. This not
only holds for a few selected, central, and widely cited findings, but also for the majority of 100
randomly selected effects published in three authoritative psychology journals. This has stirred a
heated debate about the role, necessity, and desirability of replication in psychology. It has led Nobel
laureate Daniel Kahneman, in an open letter published in the journal Nature, to urge social
psychologists to “do something about this mess.”7 We suggest that one largely underestimated
cause of the replication crisis in psychology is the wide conceptual gap between the context of
discovery and the context of justification. The often large number of reasoning steps between a
psychological theory or hypothesis and the prediction that is derived from it means that many
“bridging assumptions” have to be made to arrive at a testable prediction. And the more assumptions
that have to be made, the more alternative explanations (that are not forcibly required by the tested
theory) for the findings are possible.8 Wagenmakers (2007) suggests that another problem contri-
buting to the replication crisis is that NHST, the statistical paradigm that is overwhelmingly used by
psychologists, tends to overestimate the evidence against the null hypothesis and also that the
conventionally accepted significance threshold of 5% is probably putting the bar for rejecting our
null hypotheses too low (Johnson, 2013; Sellke, Bayarri, & Berger, 2001; Wetzels et al., 2011). In
other words, with our standard statistical conventions, it is “too easy” to find and publish significant
effects that are then accepted by the scientific community as reliable evidence for theories.
Alternative paradigms such as Bayesian statistics (see, e.g., Dienes, 2011; Wagenmakers, 2007) in
combination with a higher threshold for the minimal amount of required evidence (e.g., Etz &
Vandekerckhove, 2016) would largely remedy this problem but are still controversial because of the
reluctance of many researchers to specify our preexperimental uncertainty in the form of so-called
prior distributions, which is mathematically required to estimate the probability that our hypotheses
are true, given our collected data (Jaynes, 2003; Wagenmakers, 2007).
The robustness of the knowledge acquired by CA mentioned previously could inspire psycholo-
gists studying interaction (and even those that do not—but that is an interesting topic that is beyond
the present scope) to stay conceptually closer to our actual social behavior “in the wild.” To illustrate
how important it can be not to rely solely on results from laboratory experiments, Branigan,
Pickering, and Cleland (2000) found that in a controlled experiment, people tend to copy the
syntactic structure of their interlocutor’s previous utterances more often than pure chance would
predict. This is one of the central findings often cited as providing support for Pickering and
Garrod’s (2004) theory that our dialogue behavior is primarily driven by resource-cheap automatic
priming processes. However, extensive corpus studies by Healey et al. (Healey, Howes, & Purver,
2010; Healey, Purver, & Howes, 2014) demonstrated that in natural dialogues, people copy the
7Kahneman’s open letter can be found at http://www.nature.com/polopoly_fs/7.6716.1349271308!/suppinfoFile/Kahneman%
20Letter.pdf.
8This is a problem narrowly related to the famous “Quine-Duhem Thesis” (see Harding, 2012).
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syntactic structure of utterances in their interlocutor’s previous contribution less often than chance
would predict. Also, an analysis by Schegloff (1997) revealed that when repetitions occur in
conversation, they are not produced automatically but instead perform a range of specific social
actions, mostly related to conversational repair. So it is overly optimistic to assume that effects found
under controlled laboratory conditions provide sufficient support for theories that explain behavior
outside of the lab in our real lives as social agents.
Specifically, it is important for psychologists to be aware of the limitations inherent in using the
types of data mentioned in the earlier quote by Heritage, especially data that are either generated by
or filtered through the preempirical introspection and intuitions of the researcher. This is especially
important for the study of interaction because interactive behaviors are not (only) symptoms of some
cognitive process but above all actions designed for a recipient (Melden, 1961). If we have evidence
that average reaction times or pupil dilation measurements are systematically related to mental
processing load, we can at least infer something about the average processing load during that
particular mental process. However, if we average laughter rates or mutual gaze, these aggregated
values may have little relevance for the individual interaction events on which they are based because
the interpretation of these signals is primarily done by the interactants themselves and not by the
measurements of the “objective” researcher. In other words, we also need to know what the
behaviors under study are doing. A common defense of the use of aggregate values is that even
when not every individual data point is “valid” in the sense outlined previously, they still give reliable
information about tendencies. But it still heightens the risk of hidden but relevant variables changing
or even reversing findings, as is most convincingly demonstrated by Simpson’s paradox (Blyth, 1972;
Simpson, 1951).
Also, in order to achieve experimental control, many interaction studies rely on tasks that are
invented by researchers, which causes the participants to communicate in unusual ways with
strangers or preinstructed confederates. These types of task may in fact be closer to an exercise in
role-playing or amateur theater than to a socially relevant real-life interaction (see also De Ruiter,
2013; Stokoe, 2014).
Psychology can help clarify CA’s epistemological claims
Following Garfinkel’s (1967) and Schegloff’s (1993) critiques of experimentation and quantification
in the social sciences, CA researchers have studiously avoided using these methods. However,
although CA’s “theoretical asceticism” (Levinson, 1983) has allowed it to avoid many of the pitfalls
that psychology seems to risk stumbling into, abstinence from falsificationism has come at a price.
Firstly, there is a lack of clarity about the role of falsificationism within the CA literature. For
example, Heritage notes the risk that CA’s focus on the reflexive accountability of all action within
social interaction may “produce generalizations that become unfalsifiable and, hence, nonempirical”
(Heritage, 2012a). Indeed, CA research into epistemics (which deals with ostensible states of mutual
knowledge as ubiquitously relevant interactional issues) has been criticized for straying too far from
CA’s ethnomethodological roots in this direction (Lindwall, Lymer, & Ivarsson, 2016). However,
Heritage’s foundational descriptions of “epistemics in action” (2012b, 2012c) do not in fact formulate
hypothetical claims or attempt to falsify them. CA has, nonetheless, provided grist for the mill of
experimental interaction studies. For example, Bögels, Kendrick, and Levinson (2015), who do
formulate and test hypotheses, operationalize the phenomenon of preference organization in con-
versation. A clear understanding of the epistemological distinctions between falsificationism and
ethnomethodology could allow researchers to use these approaches in concert rather than “throwing
the baby out with the bathwater,” as Steensig and Heinemann (2016) put it. There are also many
other research methods and sources of data in psychology that could open new avenues of research
within CA without requiring researchers to abandon their ethnomethodological principles. The fact
that preempirical conceptualizations can and often do lead to “shallow” theories that are not firmly
grounded in social reality doesn’t mean that deriving and testing predictions from theories is in itself
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a bad idea. It would, in our view, be very fruitful if CA researchers took some of the patterns of
action and social practices they have discovered and generate predictions that could subsequently be
tested cumulatively, in ways that contribute to falsifying theories in other fields including, of course,
psychology.
More broadly, the issue of generalization—or as psychologists would say, “external validity”—is a
divisive epistemological issue within CA. It is of great value to know to what extent a practice or
phenomenon found in one language community or on one situated occasion of use might or might
not be the same in another. CA’s generalizations have tended to focus on the systematic conventio-
nalization and grammaticalization of recurrent patterns of talk. However, video-based studies of
embodied interaction tend instead to emphasize the evidential importance of specific, situated
occasions of interaction (Mondada, 2016). The “embodied turn” in interaction research (Nevile,
2015) toward exploring visible, copresent social action is productively challenging many of CA’s
foundational generalizations, which were mostly derived from analyses of talk on the phone
(Couper-Kuhlen, 2010). We argue that experimental methods for predicting and testing general-
izations could offer a similarly productive experimental counterpart to the challenges of analyzing
embodiment, which would benefit CA by highlighting findings that have been, for whatever reason,
inaccurate or inadequately specified. One of the most convincing ways to argue that a CA finding is
not reliable is by taking the additional (if epistemologically distinct) step of formulating it into a
falsifiable hypothesis, testing it, then trying to replicate the analysis as closely as possible with new
data. A good example of such an enterprise is the study by Stivers et al. (2009), which provided
evidence that the uncanny ability of conversationalists to anticipate the end of their interlocutor’s
turns (De Ruiter et al., 2006; Sacks et al., 1974; Wilson & Zimmerman, 1986) is a universal property
of human communication.
We appeal to CA researchers to engage with more conventional experimental methods in the
human sciences and to share CA’s critical awareness of the distinctions between coding and
quantifying more reflexively normative practices on the one hand and the pitfalls of attempting to
code more reflexively accountable practices on the other. For example, Stivers (2015) points out that
coding turn-initial utterances as more or less “response-relevant” social actions (Stivers & Rossano,
2010) is potentially an inappropriate use of coding and quantification because when analysts code an
action as either initial or not, the analyst’s binary decision eclipses the subtle ways participants
themselves may maintain a degree of uncertainty about whether an action requires a response
(Couper-Kuhlen, 2010). Similarly, the ascription of analyst-oriented “action-types” (Levinson,
2012) to particular utterances may be relatively secure when coding highly routinized patterns of
social action such as “requests for information” designed as reflexively normative “first order
actions” in talk on the phone (Heritage, 2012c). However, coding may be less appropriate in
copresent settings, where participants may manage the potential consequences of doing unequivocal
assessments, noticings, or announcements using embodied actions or by producing them as “defea-
sibly” equivocal social actions (Sidnell, 2012). By combining CA and experimental approaches, we
suggest that researchers can better understand and take into account the limits of what kinds of
phenomena and what kinds of social settings are formally analyzable.
Proposals and challenges for a methodological fusion
For a methodologically coherent fusion of psychology and CA in the study of human interaction, a
number of challenges will have to be addressed. We outline five proposals and challenges, without
claiming to be comprehensive. We do not aim to supplant one method with another or to cast either
as primary. A fusion of CA and psychology should combine their practical methods and respect their
distinct epistemological constraints.
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CA should be the starting point for experiments in human interaction
In order to be able to do controlled experiments, which is seen as the gold standard of providing
empirical support for causal explanations (see De Ruiter, 2013, for a more detailed discussion) we
have to find acceptable compromises between internal validity (e.g., control of independent and
potentially confounding variables, proper operationalizations, and accurate measurement, etc.) on
the one hand and ecological validity on the other. Many interaction psychologists, one of the present
authors included (see Newman-Norlund et al., 2009; Willems et al., 2010), have been dangerously
optimistic about the consequences of letting experimental participants perform artificial interactive
tasks, of having them interact with confederates whose behavior we try to control, or even having
them believe interlocutors are interacting with them while the behavior of these presumed inter-
locutors is in fact generated by automated scripts. Even if such studies result in statistically
significant (and therefore potentially publishable) findings, that does not automatically mean that
the results are valid. The findings could be significant and irrelevant or misleading at the same time.
We therefore propose that experimental hypotheses are formulated based on CA studies using
maximally detailed recordings of natural interaction.
Experimental situations should also be subjected to interactional analysis
A phenomenon observed in natural interaction may be impossible to recreate as such in a laboratory. Also,
in terms of what is interactionally relevant in any given situation, there is no intrinsic distinction between
“natural” and “contrived” data (Speer, 2002). We therefore propose combining validation studies that
explore the limits and consequences of artificial scenarios, role-playing, and the use of confederates (see,
e.g., Kuhlen & Brennan, 2013) with CA studies of experimental scenarios as interactional occasions. For
example, CA studies of experiments based on introspective self-report have provided valuable insight into
the pragmatics and accountability of introspection (Wooffitt & Holt, 2011). There is also a rich tradition of
CA research into the interactional dynamics and constraints of standardized survey procedures (Antaki,
2000; Drew, Toerien, Irvine, & Sainsbury, 2014; Maynard, Houtkoop-Steenstra, Schaeffer, & Van Der
Zouwen, 2002; Maynard & Schaeffer, 2006). Doing a CA study of an experimental setting in conjunction
with a replication could simultaneously pursue complementary if epistemologically distinct research
questions. Researchers could then analyze and compare target phenomena in both natural and experi-
mental settings. The basic idea of combining naturalistic observation and experimental measures is already
well established within psychology. For example, Doob and Gross’s (1968) famous car-honking study
demonstrated that using questionnaires to ask people how they think they would behave in a certain
situation does not necessarily yield the same results as observing people’s actual behavior in that situation.
Similarly, Schober and Conrad (2012) demonstrate that measuring gaze aversion and disfluencies in survey
interviews provides valuable information about the reliability of participants’ answers. Surveys are used
almost ubiquitously in psychology to make bridging assumptions between behavioral or neurocognitive
measures, analysts’ theories and subjects’ interpretations. Meanwhile, there is already a wealth of CA
research into survey taking. We therefore propose a combined approach to explore whether—and under
which conditions—experiments, surveys, and CA studies of these formally routinized interactional settings
suggest convergent or divergent causal explanations.9
Quantification of CA-derived phenomena should be reported systematically
A third synthesis that would be required is a set of widely accepted guidelines regarding proper
quantification. Quantification is very useful to communicate the degree of “pervasiveness” of certain
phenomena within a corpus to other scientists and can be used to quantify and report uncertainty
9Potter and Hepburn (2012) outline a similar approach to using CA methods to study interview settings as a way of interactionally
grounding the research questions of survey studies common in qualitative sociology and social psychology.
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about specific phenomena or explanations. We cannot always expect 100% certainty in our theories,
as no theory is ever perfect. But if 98% of all swans are white, assuming that swans are white is a
much better heuristic than if only 60% of all swans are white, which makes reporting the estimated
percentages very useful in guiding further research in the relevant branch of ornithology. The classic
CA papers that Stivers (2015, p. 6) cites as exemplary of how CA studies tend to use vague
distributional descriptors such as “massively,” “overwhelmingly,” and “regularly” could easily replace
those terms with accurate but clearly informal “counts.” Gail Jefferson (1988) sets a precedent when
she describes searching through masses of transcribed conversational data in the early stages of
identifying a candidate CA phenomenon before starting to work on a more qualified analytic
characterization of it. Today this practice is not unusual in CA studies of particular linguistic
phenomena (see, e.g., Mandelbaum, 2014; Thompson, Fox, & Couper-Kuhlen, 2015). This kind of
informal counting does nothing to diminish the value of CA findings. If anything, exposing this
process would clarify and distinguish CA’s use of inferential heuristics from the more formal
quantifications required by preexperimental CA-based coding schemes (Dingemanse, Kendrick,
Enfield, & Heritage, 2016; Enfield, Stivers, & Levinson, 2010). As argued in De Ruiter (2013), the
problems that Schegloff (1993) identifies with quantification are nontrivial and worrying, but
Schegloff’s analysis itself suggests a possible solution for some of these problems. Indeed, as
Schegloff argues, if we count occurrences of laughter or continuers, we would have to count them
as a proportion of the number of opportunities in which laughter or continuers could have occurred.
But knowing that, we can proceed to actually identify and count those opportunities and by doing so
allow our quantifications to become much more informative. So instead of adopting either CA’s
tendency to simply avoid doing or even discussing formal quantification, or interaction psychology’s
tendencies to count whatever phenomena we imagine could be informative and then perform
statistical tests on them as a kind of scientific ritual (Gigerenzer, 2004), it would be much better
to work toward an approach to quantification that addresses the valid concerns of both psychologists
and conversation analysts.
Our questions should be alert to, but not limited by, our methodological choices
We have to be careful not to adapt our research questions too much to the limitations of one
methodology. For example, Schegloff (1987) finds two general types of problems that lead to
conversational repair: One is problematic reference, which Schegloff calls “relatively straightforward,”
and the other has to do with sequential implicativeness, which he qualifies as “interesting” (p. 204).
However, most, if not all, psycholinguistic studies on conversational repair using dialogue tasks are
about problematic reference (E. A. Schegloff, personal communication, August 3, 2010). This is
because it is the only type of repair situation that we can easily invoke in a laboratory with
experimental participants performing a dialogue task (e.g., Anderson et al., 1991). It would not be
a good idea to only study repair with problematic reference and then assume that our findings
generalize to all types of repair. We therefore propose to systematize some ways to discover more
“interesting” and hard to operationalize interactional phenomena for psycholinguistic study using
CA. For example, CA’s long-term engagement with detailed qualitative analysis of interaction in
medical care has revealed the highly routinized structure of doctor-patient consultations (Heath,
1990; Heritage & Maynard, 2006). The normative constraints on interaction in many institutional
settings (Drew & Sorjonen, 1997) include obvious issues such as that the consultation lasts a limited
time, and both doctors and patients therefore have to manage these constraints interactionally. CA
researchers’ familiarity with normative patterns of interaction in these settings can help to formulate
situated research questions, to define appropriate behavioral measures, and to choose experimental
variables that would be unimaginable through introspection—even by experts. In this vein, a subtle
but powerful experiment by Heritage, Robinson, Eliott, Beckett, and Wilkes (2007) demonstrates
how exploiting minor differences in the preference structure associated with the single word any or
some when the doctor asks “Do you have any/some other concerns?” at the end of a consultation can
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vastly reduce the number of unmet concerns patients report afterwards. The experimental data,
statistical analyses, and CA findings from the combined approach proposed here will not triangulate
on the same empirical questions, the same kinds of causal explanations, or build on the same
epistemological foundations. Nonetheless, CA researchers would clearly benefit from being able to
exploit the opportunities opened up by this proposed fusion for developing—as Steensig and
Heinemann (2015) suggest—“new angles and new qualitative studies.” Similarly, psychologists
could find unique opportunities within these studies to develop new and elegant ways to operatio-
nalize Schegloff’s more “interesting” interactional phenomena.
Conversation analysts and cognitive psychologists need to establish theoretical interfaces
It is urgently necessary that we develop “theoretical interfaces” between CA and cognitive psychology,
enabling us to theorize about the interlocking of cognitive faculties with social behavior. On the one
hand, theories of cognition depend on interaction as the most evidently and fundamentally cognitive
activity. It is not a coincidence that the high bar represented by the Turing Test for Artificial Intelligence
is based on having a convincing informal conversation with a machine. On the other hand, interaction
itself is not possible without the vast neurocognitive architecture supporting it. Given that we are a highly
social species, it is plausible that our cognitive faculties have been strongly shaped by adaptations that
meet the complex demands of interaction (Levinson, 1995). It makes sense, therefore, that we should
combine approaches designed to investigate the human faculties shaped by evolution with approaches
that ask how we use those faculties as resources for social action. For example, De Ruiter and Cummins
(2012) propose a computational model that combines interactional resources (utterances, gestures, etc.)
and information about their conventional uses to generate testable predictions about mental processes of
action recognition (see Cummins & De Ruiter, 2014 for a discussion of other computational approaches
to the same problem). By extension, CA studies of mechanisms such as repair can provide insights into
the practical procedures of action recognition that work as naturalistic constraints on psychological
theorizing (Schegloff, 2006).
Concluding remarks
Luckily, there are many signs that multidisciplinary fusions of CA and psychology are on the rise.
The recent interest in the cognitive mechanisms underlying predictive turn taking (De Ruiter et al.,
2006; Keitel, Prinz, Friederici, Von Hofsten, & Daum, 2013; Levinson, 2016) and the use of
quantitative methods to find universal norms of human interaction (Dingemanse, Torreira, &
Enfield, 2013; Stivers et al., 2009) are all examples of a fruitful synthesis of the empirical rigor of
CA and the methodological flexibility of psychology.
Looking critically at results from other fields through one’s own methodological glasses, as we
tend to do instinctively, is hardly going to facilitate collaboration between different disciplines. For
developing effective multidisciplinary collaborations, it is much more fruitful to look critically at
one’s own results from the methodological perspective of others.
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